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Abstract. Audio Adversarial Examples (AAE) represent specially cre-
ated inputs meant to trick Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) systems
into misclassification. The present work proposes MP3 compression as a
means to decrease the impact of Adversarial Noise (AN) in audio sam-
ples transcribed by ASR systems. To this end, we generated AAEs with
the Fast Gradient Sign Method for an end-to-end, hybrid CTC-attention
ASR system. Our method is then validated by two objective indicators:
(1) Character Error Rates (CER) that measure the speech decoding per-
formance of four ASR models trained on uncompressed, as well as MP3-
compressed data sets and (2) Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) estimated for
both uncompressed and MP3-compressed AAEs that are reconstructed
in the time domain by feature inversion.
We found that MP3 compression applied to AAEs indeed reduces the
CER when compared to uncompressed AAEs. Moreover, feature-inverted
(reconstructed) AAEs had significantly higher SNRs after MP3 compres-
sion, indicating that AN was reduced. In contrast to AN, MP3 compres-
sion applied to utterances augmented with regular noise resulted in more
transcription errors, giving further evidence that MP3 encoding is effec-
tive in diminishing only AN.
Keywords: Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) · MP3 Compression
· Audio Adversarial Examples
1 Introduction
In our increasingly digitized world, Automatic Speech Recognition (ASR) has
become a natural and convenient means of communication with many daily-use
gadgets. Recent advances in ASR push toward end-to-end systems that directly
infer text from audio features, with sentence transcription being done in a sin-
gle stage, without intermediate representations [25,13]. Those systems do not
require handcrafted linguistic information, but learn to extract this information
by themselves, as they are trained in an end-to-end manner. At present, there
is a trend towards Deeper Neural Networks (DNN), however these ASR models
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are also more complex and prone to security threats: Audio Adversarial Exam-
ples (AAEs) are audio inputs which carry along a hidden message induced by
adding Adversarial Noise (AN) to a regular speech input. AN is optimized so
that it will mislead the ASR system into misclassification (i.e., recognizing the
hidden message), while the AN itself is supposed to remain inconspicuous to hu-
mans [6,15,2,21]. Yet from the perspective of ASR research, the system should
classify the sentence as close as it is understood by humans. For this reason, we
proceed to investigate MP3 compression as a means to diminish the detrimental
effects of AN to ASR performance. Our contributions are three-fold:
– We create AAEs in the audio domain via a feature inversion procedure;
– We evaluate MP3’s effectiveness to diminish AN with four end-to-end ASR
models trained on different levels of MP3 compression that decode AAEs in
uncompressed and MP3 formats derived from the VoxForge corpus;
– Conversely, we assess the effects of MP3 compression when applied to inputs
augmented with regular, non-adversarial noise.
2 Related Work
Adversarial Examples (AEs) were first created for image classification tasks [11].
Regular gradient-based training of DNNs calculates the gradient of a chosen
loss function w.r.t. the networks’ parameters, aiming for their step-wise gradual
improvement. By contrast, the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [11] creates
AN based on the gradient w.r.t. the input data in order to optimize towards
misclassification. FGSM was already applied in the context of end-to-end ASR
to DeepSpeech [13,7], a CTC-based speech recognition system, as well as for the
attention-based system called Listen-Attend-Spell (LAS) [8,23].
For generating AAEs, most of the previous works have set about to pursue
either one of the following goals, sometimes succeeding in both: (1) that their
AAEs work in a physical environment and (2) that they are less perceptible to
humans. Carlini et al. [6] were the first to introduce the so-called hidden voice
commands, demonstrating that targeted attacks operating over-the-air against
archetypal ASR systems (i.e., solely based on Hidden Markov Models - HMM),
are feasible. In contrast to previous works that targeted short adversarial phrases,
[7] constructed adversarial perturbations for designated longer sentences. Their
novel attack was achieved with a gradient-descent minimization based on the
CTC loss function, which is optimized for time sequences. Moreover, [21] were the
first to develop imperceptible AAEs for a conventional hybrid DNN-HMM ASR
system by leveraging human psychoacoustics, i.e., manipulating the acoustic
signal below the thresholds of human perception. In a follow-up publication [22],
their psychoacoustic hiding method was enhanced to produce generic AAEs that
remained robust in simulated over-the-air attacks.
Protecting ASR systems against AN that is embedded in AEs has also been
primarily investigated in the image domain, which in turn inspired research in
the audio domain. Two major defense strategies are considered from a security-
related perspective [14], namely proactive and reactive approaches. The former
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aims to enhance the robustness during the training procedure of the ASR models
themselves, e.g., by adversarial training [23] or network distillation [19]. Reactive
approaches instead aim to detect if an input is adversarial after the DNNs are
trained, by means of e.g., input transformations such as compression, cropping,
resizing (for images), meant to at least partially discard the AN and thus recover
the genuine transcription. Regarding AAEs, primitive signal processing opera-
tions such as local smoothing, down-sampling and quantization were applied to
input audio so as to disrupt the adversarial perturbations [26]. The effectiveness
of that pre-processing defense was demonstrated especially for shorter-length
AAEs. Rajaratnam et al. [20] likewise explored audio pre-processing methods
such as band-pass filtering and compression (MP3 and AAC), while also ventur-
ing to more complex speech coding algorithms (Speex, Opus) so as to mitigate
the AAE attacks. Their experiments, which however targeted a much simpler
keyword-spotting system with a limited dictionary, indicated that an ensemble
strategy (made of both speech coding and other form of pre-processing, e.g.,
compression) is more effective against AAEs.
3 Experimental Set-up
MP3 is an audio compression algorithm that employs a lossy, perceptual audio
coding scheme based on a psychoacoustic model in order to discard audio infor-
mation below the hearing threshold and thus diminish the file size [5]. Scho¨nherr
et al. [21] recently hypothesized that MP3 can make for a robust countermea-
sure to AAE attacks, as it might remove exactly those inaudible ranges in the
audio where the AN lies. However, to date there is no published experimental
work to prove the effectiveness of MP3 compression in mitigating AN targeted
at a hybrid, end-to-end ASR system. Consequently, given an audio utterance
that should transcribe to the original, non-adversarial phrase, we formulate our
research question as follows: To what extent can MP3 aid in removing the AN
and thus recover the benign character of the input? Hence, we aim to analyze
the AN reduction with two objective indicators: Character Error Rates (CER)
and Signal-to-Noise Ratio.
Pipeline from original audio data to MP3-compressed AAEs. A four-
stage pipline that transforms the original test data to MP3 compressed AAEs
was implemented; transformation includes the FGSM method and feature in-
version, as depicted in Fig. 1. To also consider the effects of MP3 compression
on the ASR performance, i.e., whether the neural network adapts to MP3 com-
pression, experiments were validated on four ASR models trained on data with
four different levels of MP3 compression (uncompressed, 128 kbps, 64 kbps and
24 kbps MP3). Format-matched AAEs were then decoded by each of the four
models.
All experiments are based on the English share of the open-source VoxForge
speech corpus. It consists of ≈130.1 hours of utterances in various English ac-
cents that were recorded and released in uncompressed format (.wav), allowing
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Fig. 1. General experimental workflow
for further compression and thus, for the exploration of our research question.
The Lame MP3 encoder3 was used as command line tool for batch MP3 compres-
sion. Log-mel filterbank (fbank) features were extracted from every utterance of
the speech corpus and then fed to the input of the ASR models in both train-
ing and testing stages. The speech recognition experiments are performed with
the hybrid CTC-attention ASR system called ESPnet [25,24], which combines
the two main techniques for end-to-end speech recognition. First, Connectionist
Temporal Classification (CTC [12]) carries the concept of hidden Markov states
over to end-to-end DNNs as training loss for sequence-classification networks.
DNNs trained with CTC loss classify token probabilities for each time frame.
Second, attention-based encoder-decoder architectures [8] are trained as auto-
regressive, sequence-generative models that directly generate the sentence tran-
scription from the entire input utterance. The multi-objective learning frame-
work unifies the Attention-loss and CTC-loss with a linear interpolation weight
(the parameter α from Eq. 1), which is set to 0.3 in our experiments, allowing
attention to dominate over CTC. Different from the original LAS ASR system
[8], we use a location-aware attention mechanism that additionally uses atten-
tion weights from the previous sequence step; a more detailed description is to
be found in [17].
Losshybrid = α log pCTC(Y |X) + (1 − α) log pAtt.(Y |X), α ∈ [0, 1] (1)
Full descriptions of the system’s architecture can be consulted in [25,24,17]. We
use the default ESPnet configuration4 for the VoxForge dataset [1].
Adversarial Audio Generation. The four trained ASR networks are subse-
quently integrated with an algorithm called Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM
[11]) adapted to the hybrid CTC-attention ASR system, with a focus on attention-
decoded sequences [9]. It generates an adversarial instance for each utterance of
the four non-adversarial test sets with different degrees of MP3-compression.
This method is similar to the sequence-to-sequence FGSM, as proposed in [23].
3 https://lame.sourceforge.io/about.php
4 ESPnet commit 81a383a9. The full parameters’ configuration is also listed in Table
4.2 of the Master’s Thesis underlying this publication [3].
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Fig. 2. AAEs generation via feature inversion applied to the adversarial features
A previously decoded label sequence y∗
1:L is used as reference to avoid label leak-
ing [16]. Using back propagation, cross-entropy loss J(x1:T , y
∗
l ; θ) is obtained
from a whitebox model (whose parameters θ are fully known). Gradients from a
sliding window with a fixed length lw and stride ν are accumulated to ∇AAE(xt)
(Eq. 2). Gradient normalization [10] is applied for accumulation of gradient di-
rections. The intensity of the AN (denoted by δAAE) is determined by the ǫ
factor in Eq. 3, which we set to 0.3. δAAE is then added to the original feature-
domain input xt (Eq. 4), in order to trigger the network f to output a wrong
transcription, different from the ground truth y (Eq. 5).
∇AAE(xt) =
⌈L/ν⌉∑
i=0


∇xt
lw∑
l=i·ν
J(x1:T , y
∗
l ; θ)
||∇xt
lw∑
l=i·ν
J(x1:T , y∗l ; θ)||1

 , l ∈ [0;L] (2)
δAAE(xt) = ǫ · sgn(∇AAE(xt)) (3)
xˆt = xt + δAAE(xt), ∀t ∈ [1, T ]. (4)
y 6= f(xˆt, θ) (5)
Notably, we did not aim for psychoacoustically-optimized AN, i.e., adversarial
noise that would be totally inaudible, because the focus was not on developing
powerful adversarial attacks, but rather on exploring ways to improve ASR mod-
els’ robustness to more simplistic AN. Because the networks take acoustic feature
vectors as input, FGSM originally creates AEs in the feature domain. Yet, in
order to evaluate our research hypothesis, we needed AEs in the audio domain,
that is, AAEs. Hence, we proceeded to invert the adversarial features and thus
obtain synthetically reconstructed adversarial audio (rAAEs). The exact steps
for both forward feature extraction, as well as feature inversion are illustrated
in Fig. 2 and were implemented with functions from Librosa toolbox [18].
Additionally, mind that log-mel fbank features are a lossy representation of
the original audio input, since they lack the phase information of the spectrum.
This in turn hinders a highly accurate audio reconstruction. In fact, mere listen-
ing revealed that it was relatively easy to distinguish the reconstruction artefacts
when comparing pairs of original (non-adversarial) audio samples with their re-
constructed versions5. Yet to see whether the reconstruction method impaired
in any way the ASR performance, we performed the following sanity check: the
5 Reconstructed audio samples (both non-adversarial and adversarial) can be retrieved
from https://github.com/iustinaabc/ASR-mp3-compression-AAEs
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ASR model trained on uncompressed .wav files was used to decode both the orig-
inal test set and its reconstructed counterpart (obtained by feature extraction
directly followed by inversion, i.e., without applying FGSM). We observed just
a mild 1.3% absolute increase in the Character Error Rate (CER) for the recon-
structed set, which implies that the relevant acoustic features are still accurately
preserved following audio reconstruction with our feature inversion method.
4 Results and Discussion
ASR results for non-adversarial vs. adversarial input. Table 1 conveys
the ASR results of decoding various test sets that originate from the same audio
format as the training data of each ASR model, hence in a train-test matched
setting. Adversarial inputs in the feature domain (column [b]) render far more
transcription errors (by an absolute mean of +52.05% over all models) com-
pared to the baseline, non-adversarial input listed in column [a]. This validates
the FGSM method as effective in creating adversarial features from input data
of any audio format (uncompressed, as well as MP3-compressed). The error
scores for reconstructed AAEs (rAAEs in column [c]) created from the adver-
sarial features are also higher than the baseline, but, interestingly, lower than
the CER scores for the adversarial features themselves. This suggests that our
reconstruction method makes the AAEs less powerful in misleading the model,
which on the other hand is beneficial for the system’s robustness to AN. When
we further compress the rAAEs with MP3 at the bitrate of 24 kbps (column
[d]), we observe an additional decline in the CER, thus indicating that MP3
compression is favourable in reducing the attack effectiveness of the adversarial
input. However, these CER values are still much higher than the baseline by
a mean absolute difference of +38.05% across all ASR models, suggesting that
the original transcription could not be fully recovered. The strongest reduction
effect (−21.31%) between MP3 rAAEs and the “original” adversarial features
can be observed in the case of adversarial compressed input (24 kbps) originat-
ing from 64 kbps compressed data. Overall, the mere numbers show that MP3
compression manages to partially reduce the error rates to adversarial inputs.
MP3 effects on Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR). SNR is a measure that
quantifies the amount of noise in an audio sample. As such, it comes natural
to assess how MP3 encoding impacts the AN in terms of SNR. Since it was
difficult to compute the SNR in the original, adversarial features’ domain, we
estimated the SNR of the reconstructed AAEs before and after MP3 compression
as follows:
SNRadv = 10 log10
power of the reconstructed speech (non-adversarial)
power of the reconstructed AN
(6)
For both the uncompressed and MP3 rAAEs, the SNR was calculated with refer-
ence to the same signal in the numerator: the reconstructed version of the original
speech utterance (no FGSM), so as to introduce similar artifacts as when recon-
structing the adversarial audio, and thus have a more accurate SNR estimation.
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Table 1. CER results for decoding adversarial input (marked as [b], [c] and [d]). The
last column indicates a relative CER score difference between adversarial features [b]
and reconstructed, MP3-compressed AAEs [d], calculated as [d]−[b]
[b]
·100(%). The inputs
from column [d] were compressed at 24 kbps.
ASR model
(source format of
train & test inputs in
[a], [b], [c], [d])
Input test data & corresp. CER scores
Relative CER
difference (%)
between [b] and [d]
[a]
Original
audio
[b]
Adv.
features
[c]
rAAEs
(reconstructed)
[d]
MP3
rAAEs
uncompressed (#1) 17.8 70.5 62.2 57.4 −18.58
128 kbps-MP3 (#2) 18.8 72.3 64.0 58.4 −19.23
64 kbps-MP3 (#3) 18.6 71.8 63.1 56.5 −21.31
24 kbps-MP3 (#4) 20.2 69.0 60.5 55.3 −19.86
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Fig. 3. Normalized histograms following SNR estimation of reconstructed adversarial
inputs (rAAEs): uncompressed (left) and MP3 at 24 kbps (right). The number of
histogram bins was set to 50 for both plots.
As expected, we obtained different SNRs for each adversarial audio, because AN
varies with the speech input. Moreover, the SNR values differed before and after
MP3 compression for each adversarial sample. As the normalized histograms in
Fig. 3 show, most of the SNR values for the uncompressed rAAEs are negative
(left plot), suggesting that the added AN has high levels and is therefore audible.
However, after MP3 compression (right plot), most adversarial samples acquire
positive SNRs, implying that AN was diminished due to MP3 encoding. To val-
idate this, we applied the non-parametric, two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)
statistical test [4] to evaluate whether the bin counts from the normalized SNR
histograms of rAAEs before and after MP3 compression originate from the same
underlying distribution. We obtained a p-value of 0.039 (< 0.05), confirming the
observed difference between the underlying distributions of the two histograms
as statistically significant. Thereby, MP3’s incremental effect on the SNR values
of adversarial samples was validated, which essentially means that MP3 reduces
the AN.
ASR results for input augmented with regular noise. To have a reference
for the behaviour of the ASR systems when exposed to common types of noise,
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Table 2. CERs for test sets augmented with regular noise (in uncompressed and MP3
formats) of different SNR values, decoded by ASR model #1
Test set augmented with:
SNR [dB]
30 10 5 0 -5 -10
[A] white noise 19.1 32.7 41.9 53.7 66.2 78.2
MP3 compressed (24kbps) 29.1 51.2 61.7 71.2 78.7 86
[B] pink noise 18.5 29.1 38.1 51.7 67.4 82.1
MP3 compr. (24kbps) 26.9 42.5 53 66.4 79.8 89.9
[C] brown noise 17.9 19.7 21.9 26.1 34.1 47.8
MP3 compr. (24kbps) 25.3 29 32.5 38 47.3 60.6
[D] babble noise 18.3 35.8 53.4 77.4 89 93.6
MP3 compr. (24kbps) 25.8 48.2 66 83.6 93.1 95.4
we assessed the effects of MP3 compression on audio inputs corrupted by regular,
non-adversarial noise as well. For this complementary analysis, we augmented
the original test sets with four noise types, namely white, pink, brown and babble
noise (overlapping voices), each boasting distinct spectral characteristics. The
noise-augmented samples and their MP3-compressed versions were then fed as
input to the decoding stage of the corresponding ASR system, i.e., the one
that was trained on audio data of the same format as the test data. Table 2
lists the CER results of this decoding experiment performed by ASR model #1
(trained on uncompressed data). Mind that all ASR systems were trained on
the original, noise-free data; therefore, decoding noisy inputs was expected to
cause more transcription errors than the original, clean data. Based on CER, one
can observe that the lower the SNR (or the higher level of noise added to the
input), the more error-prone the ASR system is, irrespective of the noise type.
The most adverse effect seems to be in the case of white and babble noise, rows
[A] and [D], which also happen to have the richest spectral content, imminently
interfering with the original speech.
Yet of utmost interest is what happens when the same treatment used for
adversarial inputs, i.e., MP3 compression, is applied to the novel speech inputs
enhanced with regular noise. These results are illustrated every second row in
Table 2. Error rates turn out always higher for MP3-compressed inputs than
for the uncompressed ones, regardless of noise type or SNR. Consequently, MP3
compression has the inverse effect compared to what was observed for adversar-
ial noise: while it triggered a reduction in the amount of errors returned by the
ASR systems to adversarial input, it failed to do so for non-adversarial noise. On
the contrary, MP3 compression increased the amount of errors for inputs aug-
mented with non-adversarial noise, especially at high and mid-range SNRs. This
further validates that MP3 compression has the desired effect of partially reduc-
ing only adversarial perturbations, whereas deteriorating the non-adversarial,
regular noise.
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5 Conclusion
In this work, we explored the potential of MP3 compression as a countermea-
sure against Adversarial Noise compromising speech inputs. To this end, we
constructed adversarial feature samples with the FGSM gradient-based method.
The adversarial features were then mapped back into the audio domain by in-
verse feature extraction operations. The resulting adversarial audio (denoted as
reconstructed) was thereafter MP3-compressed and presented to the input of
four ASR models featuring a hybrid CTC-attention architecture, having been
previously trained on four types of audio data. Our three key findings are:
1. In comparison to adversarial features, reconstructed AAEs, as well as MP3
compressed AAEs had lower error rates in their transcriptions. The error
reduction did not achieve the performance for non-adversarial input, which
implies that correct transcriptions were not completely recovered.
2. MP3 compression on the estimated SNR values of rAAEs yielded a statis-
tically significant effect, supporting the observation that MP3 increased the
SNR values of adversarial samples, which translates to AN reduction.
3. Our experiments with non-adversarial noise suggest that MP3 compression
is beneficial only in mitigating Adversarial Noise, while it deteriorates the
speech recognition performance to non-adversarial noise.
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